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Speaking on Your Own Behalf: 
Managing Footing and Representation in 
“Indigenous,” Intercultural Public Discourse
Stephen Peters
McGill University
In Canadian cities, public podium talks featuring Indigenous speakers are 
increasingly turned to as an avenue for raising public awareness and promoting social 
change. Podium talks provide occasions for Indigenous activists and spokespeople 
to tell their own stories, to speak on their own behalf. Yet, as a particular mode 
of discursive interaction, they also organize how such telling unfolds. Through 
an in-depth discourse analysis of one talk addressing Indigenous eco-activism, 
focusing in particular on pronoun use and quoted speech, this paper examines 
the affordances and obligations present in speaking both about Indigenous people 
and as an Indigenous person to non-Indigenous audiences. Investigating how 
Indigenous speakers act both with and against the contexts of interaction provide 
one approach to thinking about Indigenous agency in contemporary Canada. 
It must be recognized that no one truly has the kind of power that would 
enable them to write the story of their life free of other influences and 
pressures. We all face social/political/legal/economic/spiritual contexts 
that constrain the degree to which we can truly do what we want (Bakan, 
1989). Nevertheless, the conditions we find ourselves in are not fixed or 
immovable, and they are subject to change and movement by a series 
of individual and collective actions over time and place. Indigenous 
peoples must once again take a greater part in influencing and defining 
the social/political/legal/economic/spiritual contexts, with and against, 
which the stories of their lives are worked out. Canada is a work in prog-
ress, and Indian agency must be respected as an important element in 
the continued construction of the country…. This means that Indigenous 
stories must find greater prominence in the multifaceted interactions 
they have with individuals, institutions, and ideologies that influence the 
unfolding of their world. (Burrows, 2001, p. 15)
In the quote above, Anishnaabe legal scholar, John Burrows, affirms the place of Indigenous stories, as he puts it, in the ongoing construction of Canada.  That Indigenous “storytellers” have an important role to play is, no doubt, self-
evident to many. The continuing need for Burrows and others to make the point 
reflects the extent to which Indigenous actors continue to be stifled in exercising 
their due influence.  
But beyond noting a general lack of recognition of “Indian agency” throughout 
Canadian history, Burrows’s main target is the recursive relationship between 
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Indigenous stories and the colonial contexts in which they are told. Indigenous 
stories, in the sense of the “stories of our lives,” as Burrows put it, are worked 
out—shaped, influenced, or constrained—in the social/political/legal/economic/
spiritual contexts in which Indigenous lives are lived. Indigenous stories, in the 
sense of the opinions, experiences, and knowledges borne from Indigenous life, 
are likewise worked out—made legible—in these same contexts. While Indigenous 
stories are, for Burrows, a crucial mechanism for renewing ideologies, institutions, 
modes of interacting prevalent in Canada, it is these same ideologies, institutions, 
and modes of interacting that organize how it is these stories might be written and 
told, and what it is they might do.
Burrows’s reflection offers some guidance into what empirical approaches to 
discourse (or storytelling) and agency might investigate. If from a socio-cultural 
perspective, agency is best understood as the “socio-culturally mediated capacity 
to act” (Ahearn, 2001, p. 112), the passage specifies two key qualities relevant to 
Indigenous agency: the capacity of Indigenous people to tell their own story, and 
the capacity of Indigenous story-tellers to influence and define the contexts in 
which their stories are worked out. In this paper, I engage with these two aspects 
of Indigenous agency through an investigation of the practice of Indigenous, 
intercultural public speaking. Indigenous public speaking engagements are 
opportunities for Indigenous activists, scholars, elders, and leaders to tell their 
stories and to exert influence over the Canadian institutions and ideologies that 
shape their lives. They are also well-defined occasions for Indigenous speakers 
to be Indigenous and be recognized as Indigenous. At the same time, such 
presentations are laden with challenges, involving, as I discuss below, a complex 
entanglement of voicings of self, community, and culture. Indigenous public 
speaking engagements are, by design, complex multi-ethnic settings for working 
out Indigenous stories, in both senses, and, as such, important opportunities 
for analysts to understand better how Indigenous society and culture are being 
presented to Canadian publics on the ground.   
The data for my analysis come from an environmental activist speaking event 
from early 2014. This event featured one Indigenous public podium speaker, 
Crystal Lameman of Beaver Lake First Nation, critically engaging with the context 
with which and against which she told her story and the story of her community. 
Focusing specifically on her talk and its staging, I examine how Lameman makes 
contact with the here-and-now of the event. By doing so, there is, I argue, much 
to be learned about how the genre of public, intercultural podium talks—as a 
context and mode of interaction for Indigenous storytelling—organize and enable 
the telling of Indigenous stories. There is also much to be appreciated about how 
Indigenous activist-educators like Crystal Lameman act agentively within this 
context and on this context through their public speaking. 
In this spirit, this paper examines how one Indigenous speaker handles the 
organization of Indigenous podium talk and the communicative possibilities 
and constraints such organization implies. Analysis of a series of episodes from 
Lameman’s talk exemplifies the challenges inherent in self-consciously ethnic 
public speaking. Lameman’s effort to work with these challenges (to the extent 
that she is able) allows me to build the main arguments of this chapter. First, that 
Indigenous, intercultural podium talks present an abiding exigence for speakers 
to enfold their personal voice into the voice of their community. Second, that the 
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“Indigenous” category of Indigenous speaker (or any kind of “identity” speaker) 
does not simply reflect the biographical background that makes pertinent 
what speakers have to say. Rather, the ethnic identification of the speaker has 
implications for how Indigenous speakers participate in the activity of the podium 
talk. The interactional relevance of an ascribed identity is, in this sense, a conduit or 
enabler of talk, the means for discursive agency. These two aspects of Indigenous 
intercultural speaking events are presented, not as limits to agency, but as a set 
of conditions that mediate just how Indigenous peoples may “once again take a 
greater part in influencing and defining” Canadian contexts in public discourse.
Speaking on Your Own Behalf as Praxis in Indigenous Podium Talk
In Montreal public speaking engagements, or podium addresses, billing 
identified Indigenous speakers are relatively common. Over the course of my 
fieldwork, opportunities to see and hear Indigenous speakers arose weekly. 
Some events, like Lameman’s, were one-off engagements, others part of longer 
series, but all, without exception, joined the political with the cultural.1 Primarily 
popular education events intended to teach the general, non-Indigenous public 
about Indigenous life and culture, audiences are most often sought out through 
non-Indigenous activist and non-governmental social networks, however, they 
are rarely restricted. Although the reach of Indigenous podium talk is relatively 
limited, their ubiquity is undeniable and indicative of the intensity with which 
reflexive discourse around Indigenous life and culture is being produced in 
Canada for non-Indigenous uptake. After decades of being spoken for, the new 
ethical standard for organizers, scholars, and concerned members of the public is 
for Indigenous people—Cree, Kanien’kehá:ka, Innu, Residential School survivors, 
urban Indigenous people, and so on—to tell their stories, to speak on their own 
behalf on the issues that touch their various communities.
If speaking on your own behalf is now the understood best practice in Indigenous 
popular education and awareness-raising, it should not suggest that doing so is 
straightforward or unproblematic. From an interactional perspective, the defining 
quality of decidedly “Indigenous” public speaking is that they overlay participation 
frameworks (e.g., speakers’ prolonged floor time, an attentive and mum audience; 
Goffman, 1981) with an ethnic divide assigned ahead of the interaction. An event 
delivers on the basis of a unification of participation roles and social categories 
(or “alignment”; see Zimmerman, 1998). While for organizers and audience 
members, Indigenous podium addresses provide an ethically responsible avenue 
for awareness raising and political mobilization, for analysts, what is most striking 
about cross-cultural addresses is that they involve, simultaneously, both the 
presentation and performance of Indigenous/non-Indigenous difference. From the 
podium, an Indigenous speaker speaks, at least to some extent, as an Indigenous 
person to an audience who, in some important way, is not. The face-to-face nature 
of podium talks brings this interactional dynamic to the fore, but it is true of all 
kinds of discourse practices where ethnically-identified speakers address outsiders. 
What kinds of challenges, constraints, or conditions does this impose on speakers? 
1  The data for this paper come out of 14 months of fieldwork carried out from 2013 to 2015. During this 
time over 70 events were tracked. For a selection of these events, including Lameman’s, fieldnotes and 
recordings were taken. When possible, interviews with speakers and organizers were also gathered.
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How does this implied discourse structure shape how speakers can and do take 
up intercultural podium addresses? And, further, what might the organization of 
talk, and the talk itself, tell us about speaker agency?
Indigenous Agency and Expression
After decades of representations of Indigenous peoples as the objects of the 
actions of others—portrayals that have motivated Western interventionism of all 
kinds (see, e.g., Blackstock, 2009; Castile, 2008)—there is clear warrant to bring 
to the fore (and share the other story) of how Indigenous peoples have always 
used the means available for their own purposes (see Cornell, 1988; Deloria, 
1981; Jaimes, 1992; Manuel & Posluns, 1974; Tully, 2000). Indigenous agency and 
resiliency is now an object of scholarly inquiry and debate in its own right with a 
number of scholars theorizing what a distinctively Indigenous action is and what 
forms it may take (Alfred, 2005; Burrows, 2001; Gledhill, 2001; Harrison, Byrne, & 
Clarke, 2013; O’Neil Spady, 2009; Miller & Davidson-Hunt, 2013; Vizenor, 1994). 
Even if theories of Indigenous agency are not always specified and incorporated 
within larger philosophical and empirical debates about human agency (e.g., the 
role of intentionality, collectivity, structure, discourse, etc.; Ahearn, 2001; Giddens, 
1984; Taylor, 1985), accounts nevertheless imply conceptualizations of what agency 
is, how it is realized, and what marks it as Indigenous. Unsurprisingly, given 
Canada’s history of settler colonialism, social and political accounts of Indigenous 
agency have often been discussed with respect to Indigenous resistance to imposed 
governance, economic, and cultural systems (Alfred & Corntassel, 2005; Alfred, 
Coulthard, & Simmons, 2006; Blaser, Feit, & McRae, 2004; Hibbard & Lane, 2004; 
Maxwell, 1994; Reimerson, 2013; Todd, 2000/2001). The alignment of Indigenous 
agency with resistance reflects larger structure-agency dichotomies long-stressed 
in the social sciences. On the one hand, agency equates with subversion, newness, 
autonomy, and transformation within histories of domination and control. 
Structure, on the other, is a constraint or limitation to action. Whether the focus 
of inquiry is on autonomous Indigenous action or ongoing colonial systems 
of control and exploitation, accounts of agency as resistance tend to bifurcate 
Indigenous agency from the social norms and processes through which cross-
cultural interaction takes place.
Praxis and Indigenous, Intercultural Expression
The burgeoning research in North America on staged, intercultural Indigenous 
talk has similarly tended to separate out Indigenous discursive action from 
its intercultural contexts. Research has identified the performative power of 
recognizable Native American linguistic forms and heritage languages (Dinwoodie, 
1998; P. Moore, 2007), the political work of Indigenous place names (Webster, 2010) 
and declarations of nationhood (Dinwoodie, 1998; Morris & Wander, 1990), and the 
malleability of native story-telling genres (Cruickshank, 1997). Across this work, 
scholars have provided much needed and often finely detailed insight into just how 
Indigenous speakers leverage the political utility of staged performances. 
But this emphasis on Indigenous discursive action has come somewhat at 
the expense of a better understanding of the staging of Indigenous intercultural 
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talk. Art gallery and museum exhibition research has, at least in part, filled the 
void. Clifford’s (1988) classic study of why some Indigenous cultural productions 
ended up in museums while others managed to break into the world of Western 
art paved the way for a wealth of ethnographic and empirical studies exploring 
institutional practices of construing and attributing value to Indigenous difference 
and of establishing what counts as appropriate kinds of cultural exchange (e.g., 
Butler, 2000; King, 2011; Nelson, 2006; Townsend-Gault, 1995). The scholarship 
emphasizes how Indigenous expression always occurs within and must respond 
to larger networks of interest that fuel the presentation and circulation of 
Native American difference.  Yet artistic productions nevertheless re-iterate and 
potentially transform their contexts of action (see, e.g., Elston, 2012; Fowler, 2007; 
Townsend-Gault, 2011). 
Together, the discourse analytic work and research carried out in art and 
museum contexts suggest an approach to the analysis of Indigenous, intercultural 
expression that avoids, on the one hand, deterministic portrayals that erase 
Indigenous action, and, on the other, celebratory accounts overstating expressive 
will and freedom. Reflexive, Indigenous, intercultural expression is, as Myers 
(1994) has noted, essentially “fraught with difficulties” where “the rules of 
production [and] reception” are always under revision; but it is for those very 
reasons generative and potentially transformative (p. 679; see also Myers, 2013). 
Required is a kind of analysis that can identify just how speakers, performers, and 
artists engage with the rules that shape how and why their expressive acts are 
called for and heard. 
Such an approach is not new to studies of oral performances. In his work 
on oral storytelling, Bauman (1986) identifies the central tension: If an oral 
performance is to be effective, it must abide by certain “social interactional 
ground rules, norms, strategies for performance and criteria for its interpretation 
and evaluation” (p. 4). But, at the same time, performances and the events in 
which they are carried out are emergent, making for variability and newness. 
Any individual performance is potentially transformative, re-figuring what a 
genre or practice of performance is about, what it does, and for whom. In oral 
performance, as Bauman puts it, “the individual and the creative are brought up 
to parity with tradition in a dialectic played out within the context of situated 
action, a kind of praxis” (p. 4). Taking intercultural talk as praxis allows analysts 
to consider the two sides of agency as proposed by Burrows (2001), to explore 
how actors act with the contexts which organize their activities and against these 
contexts, redefining them with this very activity. In the case of Crystal Lameman’s 
event and others like it, we want to know how the explicit “Indigenous” framing 
and appeal of podium talks shape the “ground rules, norms, and strategies for 
performance” and how speakers grapple with those rules as they set out to do 
the work they have to do.
Data and Analysis
Crystal Lameman’s talk was organized by a US environmental NGO, 350 
Maine, and addressed the impact of and the fight against tar sands development 
on Beaver Lake’s traditional territory. My analysis centres on a critical exchange 
between Lameman and an audience member during the closing Q&A. The 
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exchange, transcribed in Excerpt 3, provokes an extended meta-commentary by 
Lameman on the conditions of participation—or ground rules—in intercultural 
public speaking events. The excerpt shows Lameman rejecting these conditions, 
but in doing so, abandoning, at least with respect to the question posed, the public 
speaking duties she had been invited to perform. 
Prior to taking up this exchange, however, I examine two earlier episodes in 
Lameman’s talk. The first comes from the beginning; the second from roughly 
midway. The two episodes present both the confident and more ambivalent ways 
Lameman participated in the organization and practice of intercultural podium 
talk. Across all three extracts, I target reflexive and indexical language2 (Agha, 
2007; Lucy, 1993). My analysis centres specifically on the speaking positions 
Lameman occupies over the course of her address. Except for Excerpt 1, I draw 
on data where the occupation becomes in some way troubled. Close attention to 
production formats and footing alignments3 (including Lameman’s own analysis of 
these footing alignment in Excerpt 3; Goffman, 1981) demonstrates the challenges 
speakers face with “speaking on their own behalf,” or more precisely animating 
their voice and the voice of the community they represent as both overlapping and 
distinct. The episodes demonstrate the nature of the speaking positions available 
to Indigenous speakers in Indigenous public speaking events, their influence, 
and the obligations they present. In essence, the analysis that follows addresses 
perennial questions around the politics of representation, but targets, empirically, 
subaltern self-representation.
Affirming Indigenous Speaker Agency
My analysis begins with the opening moments of Lameman’s formal address 
(Excerpt 1), where we find evidence of just how Lameman comes to occupy the 
official podium speaker role. I aim to show how, through the use of an Indigenous 
language greeting, she accepts the speaking on behalf role implicit to the organization 
of Indigenous podium talks. The greeting allows, I argue, Lameman to discursively 
conjoin the dual tasks of speaking about and speaking as necessary to the speaking on 
your own behalf role. To use Stuart Hall’s (1996) formulation, Lameman (figuratively 
and literally) articulates herself to the Indigenous public speaking activity and 
makes a claim for the kind of agency available in that activity. The point, while 
relatively straightforward, is important for appreciating the speech acts that follow. 
Moreover, it calls for, I believe, a slight rethinking of the pragmatics of Indigenous 
language greetings (see Ahlers, 2006; Graham, 2002).   
Before turning to the excerpt, a brief overview of Duranti’s (2004) insights into 
the language/agency relationship is useful in making clear how an Indigenous 
language greeting connects Lameman to the activity of Indigenous public speaking. 
2  In particular, I examine metapragmatic framing devices, pronoun use, reported speech, and meta-
commentary. My goal is not to examine these devices in their own right but to bring into view how 
Lameman understands and engages in the public speaking role.
3  “Production format” refers to the arrangement of different aspects of a speaker (Goffman, 1981). The 
concept opens up the blunt category of “speaker” to finer analytic divisions: the animator (the person do-
ing the speaking), the principal (person or people whose views are expressed), and the author (the origi-
nator of the words spoken, which can differ from the animator as in quoted speech). Production formats, 
which can be specified for any utterance, give insight into in what capacity a speaker is speaking, i.e., on 
behalf of whom. Footing refers to the “alignments [speakers] take up to [themselves] and others present” 
(Goffman, 1981, p. 128). Changes in production format imply changes in footing (Levinson, 1987).
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Duranti explains that any speaking performance is in two senses agentic. First, it 
provides an opportunity for a speaker to describe the world and in doing so affect 
the beliefs and possible future actions of their listener. Second, simply the use of 
language, regardless of what is said—or even it being understood—is a form of 
“ego-affirming agency” (p. 455), that is, speaking itself establishes the speaker as 
a possible discursive doer. As Duranti puts it, “the very act of speaking in front 
of others who can perceive such an act establishes the speaker as a being whose 
existence must be reckoned with in terms of his or her communicative goals and 
abilities” (p. 455). 
The generality of Duranti’s observations risk limiting their usefulness. 
However, in overtly intercultural speaking situations, when specific identities and 
specific linguistic codes are in play, Duranti’s insight can be leveraged to reveal 
just how speakers reflexively affirm and specify their agency in the here-and-now 
of their talk. 
Excerpt 1
45 ((Lameman, emphatic laughter))
46 ↑↑I guess we should have looked up there first HAHAHA ((elevated pitch, laugh-
ter before and after speech triggered by the realization that the slides were visible to the 
audience))
47 HA .hh ↑↑So(h)rry we were wondering why you guys were saying no it’s good
48 HAHAHA ((Overlapping laughter from Lameman and the audience)) 
49 OK um HA
50 Sorry about that um ((clears throat)) 
51 First of all
52 ah tánisi ((“Hello” or “How are you” in Western Cree, Lameman pronounces as [tánsi] 
with vowel shortening))
53 ah Hello
54 ah I want to acknowledge first of all hh the ah (.) the first people of ah this terri-
tory of what is now known as ah Montreal ah the greater part of ah what Mon-
treal so  °Quebec°
55 um ((clears throat))
After an extended period of technical difficulty involving roughly 30 seconds of 
informal talk (lines 1–50), a clear shift in footing occurs at line 51; Lameman’s 
laughter ceases, she issues a brief apology, and clears her throat as her address 
turns from jocular self-mockery to formal presentation. The first order of business 
is uttering the Cree word “tánisi.”
Greetings in Indigenous languages at the opening of an address are ubiquitous 
in intercultural podium talks and occur nearly without fail in my data. They are a 
“code-specific” (Garrett, 2005) practice, that is, a speech act whose effects depend on 
its formulation in a particular linguistic code. Indigenous greetings have most often 
been discussed as a means of indexing (signalling, pointing to) speakers’ Indigenous 
identity, invoking Western, monolingual language ideologies to do so (Ahlers, 2006; 
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Graham, 2002). Accounts of Indigenous greetings as “identity markers” (Ahlers, 
2006, p. 62) are valuable for drawing attention to the pragmatic value of Indigenous 
language use in contexts of language shift. However, by focusing on ethnic 
categorization, identity marking explanations risk over-looking the specific here-
and-now or participatory relevance of Native languages and the situated identities 
they evoke: Not only why an identity marker? But why now? And which one? (See 
Moore, 2012, for an assessment of “Native language as an identity marker”). 
There are two qualities to Lameman’s use of tánisi that suggest she is less 
interested in signalling her Cree identity than she is in exhibiting her fidelity to the 
podium speaker role. First is the perfunctoriness of its delivery. Lameman doesn’t 
explicitly translate tánisi (although line 53 is the translation), nor does she state 
what language she is speaking, and she utters tánisi casually (evident in the vowel 
shortening of the first “i” sound; vowel shortening in Western Cree is typical in 
more casual speech; Wolfart & Carroll, 1981). Her metapragmatic framing, “First 
of all,” in line 51 is the second quality. Although she had been addressing her 
audience prior to line 51, “First of all” signals that the official business is just now 
starting, and it is to start with an Indigenous language utterance. The absence of 
any explicit effort to make clear what tánisi means or any further indication of 
her ethnic background suggests that indexing her identity is not the only, or even 
primary, function of her use of Cree. Yet, the metapragmatic framing, “First of all,” 
does indicate that she is doing something. What is indexed with tánisi, it appears, 
is the very doing of speaking in an Indigenous language. Tánisi references not only, or 
simply, who she is as an ethnic person, but also what she’s doing at the podium.
What is the importance of the distinction? For Duranti (2004), agency 
affirmations are the by-product of speaking. Here we see Lameman staging her 
communicative abilities in Cree. Adapting Duranti’s (2004) insights into ego-
affirming agency for the case at hand, with tánisi Lameman brings into existence 
herself as a Cree actor. And she does so precisely as she embarks on the formal 
work of her invitation, that of “Indigenous” public speaker. Whatever speech acts 
follow will be performed by an Indigenous actor. Through “tánisi,” Lameman takes 
possession of the Indigenous public speaker role prepared for her in the event’s 
organization. She affirms her potential to speak as an Indigenous person, and she 
signals that her talk will be “Indigenous” speaking.
To generalize the observation, and to make a slight extension from the work of 
Ahlers (2006), I argue that Indigenous language openings in intercultural events be 
seen, not as marking speakers’ “transportable” ethnic identity but as functioning 
indexically to connect the speaker to the “institutional” or “situational” identities 
available in the event (Rampton, 2013, 2014; Zimmerman, 1998; see also Ochs, 1996). 
In this sense, Indigenous speaker belongs as much to the situation as it does to the 
identity of the speaker; it is a platform for action.  For the remainder of this chapter, I 
build off this idea by examining how Lameman manages the identity and activity of 
Indigenous speakers. As we progress, we find Lameman increasingly uneasy with 
the role or, more specifically, the production formats it calls on her to take up.
Doing Representation
Of the various speech acts that Lameman does, and that are involved in the 
role of Indigenous public speaker, the main task is, of course, to report or represent 
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Cree experience, knowledge, and political struggles. Indeed, the invitation frames 
Lameman’s talk as one that
will awaken the audience to the current realities of how their commu-
nity’s land ecosystem, cultural heritage, and health are being sacrificed 
by the world’s wealthiest and most powerful industries. (Public Face-
book invite)
Insofar as Lameman speaks both as a member of Beaver Lake and about Beaver 
Lake, to represent the current realities of her community is at the same time to be 
a representative. Excerpt 2 demonstrates just how such an overlapping becomes 
troubling for Lameman. In the passage, Lameman traces a current dispute over 
tar sands development on treaty negotiated land to a particular Cree worldview 
rooted, as she explains, in Cree language. In this passage, Lameman represents Cree 
understanding of their relationship with the earth and locates this understanding in 
a further (ideologically laden) representation of Cree language. Footing alignments 
in lines 259 to 268 in particular show a rather typical example of Lameman both 
doing the job of representing and being a representative. However, by the end of the 
excerpt, we find Lameman distancing herself from representing act.
Excerpt 2
253 So there’s eleven treaties across Canada
254 and my my people come from Treaty number six that was signed in 1876 .hh with 
the British Cro:wn
255 And it pro:mised (.) literally
((brief break in recording))
256 and to sustain yourselves to hunt, fish, trap, and forage 
257 just as if treaty had never been signed 
258 that is the agreement
259 And in in return 
260 we would share the land 
261 Because in our language 
262 there literally is n:o word for ownership of land, 
263 We we do not have that 
264 because when you literally translate that ownership to o:wn land 
265 it it really it comes out in the literal English translation is y:ou cannot own your 
Mother 
266 Our mother is the one who gives us life and nurtures US 
267 So you cannot own her
268 But we can share what our creator has given us
269 that’s what the old people said
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Except in line 268, where the “us” appears ambiguous, from 259 to the end 
of the passage Lameman makes extensive use of the exclusive first person plural 
pronominal forms (“we,” ”us,” “our”) with their anaphoric reference being “my 
people” of line 254. Such use deictically marks a membership division between 
herself and her target audience as she reports the characteristics of her people 
(specifically, Cree language structure and Cree understanding of land ownership 
and treaty obligations). As expected, the use of first person deixis here is consistent 
over the entire talk; exclusive use of “we/us/our” occurs roughly twice as often 
as the inclusive usage.
In Goffman’s (1981) terms, the use of the exclusive “we” establishes the 
principal—the person or group responsible for the ideas expressed—as a Cree 
cultural collectivity of which she is a member. But it is Lameman, as author and 
animator, who is responsible for deciding which characteristics to report and how. 
She is here (and elsewhere in the talk) doing the work of representing and acting as 
representative; in other words, she is occupying the podium role and keeping with 
the invitation’s metapragmatic framing of her talk as an “awakening.”
However, in line 269, “that’s what the old people said,” a significant change 
of footing takes place. It is a traditionalization move, following Bauman (1992), 
linking the present talk to a tradition of similar talk. It authenticates Lameman as a 
community member, as Bauman explained, but it also shifts the “provenance,” as 
Bauman put it, of Lameman’s words. If initially Lameman assumes responsibility 
for how to report Cree understanding of their Treaty rights, by retrospectively 
reframing 259–268 as quoted speech she retroactively takes responsibility only for 
the reporting of the speech, not for deciding what to report and how. This duty is 
instead transferred to “the old people” (line 269), elders in her community. 
Even if it is unlikely that Lameman meant lines 259–268 to be taken as a 
direct quote, the change in footing nevertheless unsettles her role as author. The 
passage indicates the delicate balance Lameman strikes in her talk between 
giving representations—as a member of the community represented—and simply 
animating prior representations. The analysis here suggests some equivocality 
on Lameman’s part. This simultaneous allegiance to and discomfort with the 
representative/representation work of the podium becomes more explicit in the 
subsequent Q&A discussion, which I turn to now.
Refusing Representation
By the end of the talk, Lameman is no longer able to maintain the Indigenous 
speaker role she had, as I argued above, previously accepted and managed 
throughout her presentation. In response to a question probing earlier remarks 
she made, Lameman rebels against the activity of Indigenous podium talk, 
ultimately refusing to speak at all. To bend Goffman’s (1959) terminology, here, an 
“inopportune intrusion” penetrates “the impression that [the speaker had been], 
for wider social reasons, in a position to maintain” (p. 132), that is, the footing 
alignments Lameman had struck throughout her talk. By leaving Lameman, as 
Goffman predicted, “flustered” and out of “countenance,” (p. 132) the disruption 
lays bare the involvement obligations (or the “pressures” to return to Burrow’s, 
2001, words) of the activity of Indigenous public speaking and the risks they pose 
for speakers.
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Before discussing the excerpt, a bit of background: In 2008, a lawsuit was 
brought against both the Canadian and Albertan governments by former chief 
Alphonso Lameman (Lameman’s uncle, coincidently) on behalf of Beaver Lake for 
infringing on the community’s right to hunt and fish on their traditional territories, 
a violation, Lameman explains, of the Beaver Lake’s treaty rights. The legal 
action brought considerable attention to the community from the environmental 
movement. Environmental organizations have found in Lameman, a bright and 
engaged community member who could potentially bring together Indigenous 
social justice concerns and eco-activism under a single agenda. Lameman has, for 
her part, taken advantage of a variety of avenues provided by the movement for 
both employment and for advancing the social justice issues of her community, 
including speaking at a number of events across Canada and the US. 
Nevertheless, managing in her talk the facts of the lawsuit, the diverse wishes 
of her community, and her own opinion against the values of the North American 
environmental movement proved a formidable challenge for Lameman. While the 
lawsuit was brought in the name of the community (a particularity of Canadian 
law enshrined in Canada’s Indian Act), the demands made in the lawsuit are not, of 
course, identical with the multiplicity of voices within the community. Beaver Lake 
has a variety of interests in and commitments to the tar sands industry. At the time 
of writing, Beaver Lake operated two tar sands ventures. The tar sands industry 
is a major employer in the community. Like all communities at hand to large scale 
industries, Beaver Lake is wedged between the economic returns and environmental 
costs of tar sands development. In representing this diversity, Lameman finds herself 
in a particularly challenging situation. In her role as Indigenous public speaker at 
a gathering of environmentalists, how can she represent all the diversity in her 
community without, herself, being representative of it?
Excerpt 3 is divided into three segments, transcribing on the page a speech 
chain that unfolded in Lameman’s talk. In Excerpt 3b, a questioner from the 
audience asks Lameman to elaborate on a point she made earlier in her talk, 
contained in Excerpt 3a. Excerpt 3c is Lameman’s response. The exchange centres 
on the account Lameman gives of an ongoing legal case and, more generally, her 
community’s desires with respect to oil and gas development. Excerpt 3a finds 
Lameman managing the tricky task of balancing the specifics of the legal case 
with the wishes of a diverse community who she represents for the benefit of an 
audience who, presumably, have very specific ethical views on tar sands extraction.
Excerpt 3a
574 …you know ah it’s-- thus you know save all human beings 
575 You know taking on this fight that’s gonna um ultimately protect us all 
576 ah You know and what this litigation said was-- 
577 You know we’re not saying 
578  “shut down the tar sands”
579 You know what we’re saying is you know 
580  “the bitumen is there it’s not going anywhere
581  let’s slow down here.” 
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582 You know 
583  “let’s take a step back and reassess what’s going on here”
584 And ah and so they did that and you know ah…
Lameman begins, in line 576, with an attempt to represent the details of the 
lawsuit. However, she abandons the effort, and, in line 577, introduces once again 
an exclusive (although not clearly defined) “we,” which returns Lameman to the 
regular community representative role discussed in above. In doing so, Lameman 
avoids potentially misrepresenting an ongoing lawsuit. However, the shift in 
footing from “what this litigation said” to “we’re not saying” introduces a new bind 
associated with the representative role, specifically, either misrepresent a diverse 
Cree community or give an inclusive, but potentially unfavorable, impression of 
Beaver Lake and its representative. 
There is evidence in the transcript that Lameman is indeed wary of how Beaver 
Lake’s diverse interests might displease her environmentalist audience. The shift 
in verb subject from “what this litigation said” to “we’re not saying” comes with 
a series of “you know” hedges prefacing three instances of reported speech. The 
hedges are appeals for a shared understanding within the interaction, a bid for 
convincing her audience of the self-evident nature of what follows. If successful, 
“you know” would head off any potential rift that may arise; they smooth the 
way for the “not saying to shut down the tar sands” position now attributed to 
her community. Should these hedges fail, the use of reported speech nevertheless 
affords Lameman some separation between her own view and the potentially 
controversial position expressed in a manner analogous to the traditionalization 
move discussed in Excerpt 1. As reported speech, she is not authoring these 
positions, even if the “we” includes her as principal. That her goal is to distance 
herself from the “not shut down the tar sands” position becomes even more evident 
in line 584 where the “we” is ultimately shifted to “they” in “so they did that…”. 
With the shift in pronoun, Lameman disaffiliates completely with the “let’s take a 
step back”/ “we’re not saying shut down the tar sands” position. It is one of the 
very few times in the entire talk where Lameman marks a complete break between 
her own views and those of her community.
Without a careful analysis of Lameman’s use of pronouns in managing her 
production formats and footing alignment, such “distancing” efforts are easy to 
overlook. Precisely where Lameman stands on the issue eventually comes to a head 
in the subsequent Q&A period. Regardless of the intentions of the questioner (my 
fieldnotes indicate that the question was more conversational than antagonistic, a 
request for clarification, not justification) the question (transcribed in 3b) triggers 
an extensive episode of meta-commentary in 3c on the limited range of footings in 
Indigenous podium talk, and ends with Lameman refusing to answer at all.
Excerpt 3b4
1 Um thank you for your talk 
2 um I would like to just clarify one emm one aspect to make sure I understood 
4  Line numbering starts over with this Q&A exchange. 
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3 You said something about not wanting to say that--
4 ah You’re not saying to shut down the tar sands 
5 Is there a reason why you would not want to say that?
The point of conflict is specifically with who, exactly, is not saying “shut down the 
tar sands” (line 578). The origins of the problem can be traced by briefly examining 
the use of the first person pronoun. The questioner begins posing her question 
in line 3, but stumbles with her attempt to re-report the reported speech event 
of line 578 (as reflected by the two “say” verbs). The “you” pronoun of the first 
conjugated verb in the line (“You said something about…”) is clearly Lameman 
of the event. But as the reporting becomes too grammatically burdensome, the 
questioner opts for the simpler formation of lines 4 and 5, “You’re not saying to 
shut down the tar sands / Is there a reason why you would not want to say that?”. 
While the “you” in lines 4 and 5 may very well have the exclusive community 
“we” of line 578 (“we’re not saying”) as its reference, Lameman clearly takes it as 
referencing her alone. Lameman is, thus, assigned the principal of the problematic 
“not shut down the tar sands” position, a position it appears she does not want to 
be understood as holding. What is striking in her response, however, is that instead 
of offering a clarification of her own stance towards oil and gas development, we 
hear why in the context of the podium talk, such a clarification of her personal 
opinion is impossible.
Excerpt 3c
6 Shit ((spoken under her breath but still in the microphone and audible enough 
to be picked up by the audience who begin to laugh)) (1s) 
7 um (4s) ((Lameman smiles; laughter in the crowd progressively increases)) 
8 um ((throat clearing, laughter tapers off)) (1s)
9 My personal opinion and that opinion of my leadership and my nation 
as a whole a:nd our people as a whole are all different 
10 S:o (.) that question is very unfair to ask m:e(h) ((nervous laughter)) 
11 which is why I-- I just won’t answer it 
12 because um like I said I don’t represent my nation 
13 I don’t represent my leadership 
14 I represent my children and me as a citizen member of my community 
15 um And so I-- I can’t answer that 
16 You know in a private con(h)versation 
17 me and you my personal opinion I would answer that 
18 but I can’t answer that you know 
19 and have that out there you know 
20 and have it misconstrued 
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21 and maybe me you know it comes out as if I’m speaking for my nation 
or my leadership when I don’t (1s) 
22 Sorry
In line 6 Lameman responds strongly to the question with a muffled, but still 
audible “shit.” The “shit” is humorous, and both the audience and Lameman 
delight in the impropriety. Her wry delivery suggests that she recognizes that she 
has been called out, as it were: the representor/representative footing she was 
in various ways maintaining can no longer be sustained. Although the response 
begins relatively light-hearted, it becomes much more defensive in line 10, and by 
line 11, Lameman refuses to respond to the question at all.
In her explanation of why, Lameman sketches out three available footing 
alignments for responding to the question, each unacceptable: that she speaks 
on behalf of (1) her community, (2) her leadership, (3) herself and her family. 
Although she had been previously managing the representative speaker role, 
Lameman rejects (1) and (2) outright (“my personal opinion and that opinion 
of my leadership and my nation as a whole and our people as a whole are all 
different,” line 9). Now having to defend “not shutting down the tar sands”, she 
responds that she can only adopt the much more circumscribed “principal” of (3), 
citing intra-community diversity. 
Yet even after signalling that she can only speak on her own behalf and that of 
her family, Lameman nevertheless claims that even going forward in this manner 
is impossible: she cannot prevent being understood as in some way representative, 
as in either (1) or (2). In other words, Lameman’s response suggests that although 
she takes herself to be picked out by the questioner’s “you” (in lines 4 and 5)—
that she’s indeed being asked for her personal opinion—she understands that her 
response will, nevertheless, be taken by the audience as reflective of an imagined 
(and unified) Beaver Lake voice. She identifies herself as caught in a metonymic 
replacement of her for her community inherent in the activity of podium talk. The 
podium prevents her personal opinion from remaining personal while it imposes 
generalities on her community that misrepresent its true diversity. She can do 
nothing but refuse to speak altogether. 
Discussion
The very same argument Lameman uses against responding to the question 
of Excerpt 3b could, of course, be extended to the talk as a whole, in effect, giving 
reason for refusing the invitation altogether. But to do so would be to forego the 
benefits that were possible by way of the podium and her partnership with 350 
Maine. And therein lies the rub. It can hardly be unexpected, but easily over-
looked, that the discursive acts through which political gains might be made are 
necessarily constituted by particular interactional demands and obligations that 
organize how these acts are carried out. While popular education events that allow 
Indigenous speakers to speak on their own behalf may be the best option we have 
for raising public awareness about Indigenous social and political struggle, the 
speeches possible are much more constrained, or ordered, than perhaps audiences 
are organizers realize.
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Ordering Indigenous Public Speaking
As with other studies of interaction, the premise of this paper is that social 
orders are built up by the everyday encounters people have with one another 
and the world around them. This means that, as analysts, we attempt to make 
sense of interactions always in view of larger ordering and re-ordering practices 
(Fine, 2003), the praxis approach discussed in the paper’s first and second sections. 
What structures reflexive Indigenous intercultural podium talks as a kind of ordered 
interaction is the specific lamination of ethnic identity with public speaker role. 
By design—and set into motion by their framing in the publicity surrounding 
events—Indigenous public podium talks unify being Indigenous with the task 
of representing Indigenous life. Turning our attention to Lameman’s reflexive 
engagement with the participatory demands of her talk allows for an appreciation 
of the experience of that ordering and a sense of how that order is maintained and 
challenged in actual activity. 
I opened the analysis by attempting to show how, through the emblematic 
use of a single Cree word, Lameman accepts her podium role: she affirms her 
potential to act by affirming her Cree existence, and so joins her communicative 
acts with her Cree identity. She is, at this moment, and thereafter, speaking (and 
so acting) as a Cree. And yet, as the talk continues, we find evidence that she is 
increasingly troubled by what the situational relevance of what her Cree identity 
implies for her as a public speaker engaged in the activity of public speaking. 
These troubles are not abstractions, or after-the-fact characterizations of the 
address. They bear out in the kinds of footings Lameman strikes—in the kinds 
of alignments Lameman takes up with her audience through the organization of 
the production formats of her speech.
Whose words are being spoken? Whose position is being expressed? And 
what relation do these words and positions strike to those of the speaker who 
animates them? None of these appear to have straightforward answers. As we 
see in Lameman’s talk, the use of pronouns and reported speech—the discursive 
material for Lameman to construct her footing alignments—become a site of 
micro-management and contestation. The ways pronouns and reported speech are 
and can be handled have very real implications for how Lameman represents (or 
mis-represents) her community and herself, and for how she might build avenues 
of affiliation between the social and political battles Indigenous people fight every 
day and the issues that animate and mobilize non-Indigenous publics.
Agency with the Social Contexts of Indigenous Public Speaking
Crystal Lameman’s particular engagement with the activity of Indigenous 
public speaking that January afternoon shows that Indigenous activists are aware 
of, and troubled by, the kinds of demands entailed in speaking on your own behalf 
(where “own” implies you and your community). Yet these participatory demands 
are part of the social context wherein Indigenous stories are able to be told and 
worked out. Although Lameman may have temporarily rejected the Indigenous 
public speaker role in the Q&A period, her willingness to participate in this 
event and others shows that speakers are willing to work with these participatory 
demands to take advantage of the political opportunities of podium talk. Working 
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with these contexts is one aspect of agency Burrows identifies, and it demonstrates 
the kinds of resiliency Indigenous populations in North America have exhibited 
since contact (Kirmayer, Dandeneau, Marshall, Phillips, & Willamson, 2011; 
Miller & Davidson-Hunt, 2013; Vizenor, 1994). Whatever challenges the speaking 
engagement did present Lameman, by giving her talk (and with the help of the 
organizers) she was able to raise over $3000 dollars that afternoon towards Beaver 
Lake First Nation’s legal fees while connecting with over a hundred audience 
members and a multiplicity of environmental organizations.5 
In overtly intercultural contexts, implied ethnic membership is part of the 
context with which actions and activities are carried out. For an Indigenous agency 
enacted with social contexts, agents must adhere to (or “articulate” with; Hall, 
1996) the context-specific participatory arrangement that makes their actions in 
some way culturally or ethnically recognizable. In this way, Indigenous group 
membership is not just the background to her intervention, but what provides 
for it. The question for analysts of reflexive, intercultural interaction is how 
does recognizable group membership become necessary to whatever action is 
being carried out? In the data presented in this paper we find Lameman using 
three specific devices: emblems of Cree language, reported speech (including 
traditionalization moves), and positioning a unified Beaver Lake community 
voice as the principal of her talk. Further analysis might aim to identify the extent 
to which such devices or others are in a sense mandatory to the cross-cultural 
political activities of Indigenous actors.
Agency Against the Social Contexts of Indigenous Speaking
Lameman’s meta-commentary in Excerpt 3c does suggest that the positioning of 
a unified Beaver Lake community voice as principal is in fact obligatory, or at least 
unavoidable. When these obligations become insupportable, it becomes necessary 
to ask about the second kind of agency Burrows identifies: how Indigenous speakers 
can influence and define the social contexts in which their stories are worked out. 
In our case, Lameman’s refusal to act with the participatory demands in Excerpt 
3 may be understood as an act against them. For those potential questioners who 
observed it, Lameman’s self-censorship surely gave pause. In this way, Lameman’s 
refusal to speak, however minute, counts among the “series of actions over time and 
place,” as Burrows (2001, p. 15) put it, that change the social contexts for Indigenous 
public speaking. But while it’s certainly right that Indigenous actors, like Crystal 
Lameman, “once again take a greater part in influencing and defining the social/
political/legal/economic/spiritual contexts” (p. 15) within which they act, if acts 
like Lameman’s self-censorship are to be effective, it takes all those invested in 
Indigenous public expression to be critical of how we organize ourselves to provide 
the venues for Indigenous people to speak on their own behalf.
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Appendix A
Transcription conventions (modified from Jefferson, 2004)
( . ) A dot in parentheses indicates a short, untimed pause
(1s) A number in parentheses indicates timed pause to the second
↑↓ Arrows indicate high or low pitch
°word° Degree signs indicate soften speech
wor:d Colon within a word indicates elongation of preceding sound
word Underline indicates stressed syllable or word
wo(h)rd Parenthesized h indicates laughter within a word
-- Dashes indicate cut off speech
.hh Double h preceded by full stop indicates notable in-breath
hh Double h without full stop indicates notable out-breath
((comment)) Doubled parentheses contain transcriber description of non-
speech sound or other features
